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In February 1769 the head of Russia’s College of Foreign Affairs Nikita I. Panin 
asked Ivan G. Chernyshev, the Russian special envoy to London, to relay “a true and 
comprehensive summary of English practices and customs relating to the use of 
privateers (partikuliarnye armatory) in wartime.”1 Of greatest interest to Panin were 
details such as whether Admiralty patents – or letters of marque, as they were known 
in England – were entrusted to native-born subjects only or whether “foreign 
volunteers” (chuzhestrannye okhotniki) might also secure such letters; whether 
privateers could sail from the empire’s ports only or from any neutral or allied port; 
how much latitude privateers were given in their action against enemy vessels and in 
conducting searches of neutral vessels; what rules were to be followed in 
adjudicating cases involving enemy and neutral ships; and, whether the government 
collected any guarantees or bonds from the privateer that could be used to hold him 
accountable in the event that he should commit a crime.2 Panin dispatched his 
inquiry just as the State Council debated the question of commissioning privateers in 
the spring of 1769 during the first Russian-Ottoman war (1768-1774) of Catherine II’s 
reign.3  
Before the eighteenth century was out, the Russian state had sanctioned 
privateers under the Russian flag; however, due to the ongoing uncertainty over 
which individuals or social groups actually fit into this category, this sanction boiled 
down not to a single legislative moment but rather to a process spanning three 
decades.4 Panin’s inquiry notwithstanding, the Russian government at first sought to 
fit naval auxiliaries within the existing social structures of its armed forces. These 
early efforts baldly assumed the “eagerness” of voluntaries to serve the Russian 
monarch in the wording of the first invitations to foreign subjects sail under a Russian 
                                                             
1 In 1718 Russia appropriated the collegiate model of government administration akin to the one used 
in Sweden. Each college of ten members was headed by a president. Panin, however, was never 
formally given the rank of chancellor or made president of the College of Foreign Affairs despite being 
head of Russia’s foreign policy in the 1760s and 1770s. Isabel de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of 
Catherine the Great (London: Phoenix, 2002), 189. 
2 Panin to Chernyshev, 20 February 1769, Sbornik Imperatorskago Russkago Istoricheskago 
Obshchestva (hereafter, SIRIO), 87 (1893): 334. 
3 The State Council, or “Council attached to the Court,” was formed in 1768 to consider questions 
related to the breakout of the first Russian-Ottoman War (1768-1774). Madariaga, Russia in the Age of 
Catherine the Great, 205-6. On deploying privateers, see Appendix 39 in Vladimir Ulianitskii, 
Dardanelly, Bosfor i Chernoe More v XVIII Veke (Moscow: Tipografiia A. Gatsuka, 1883), cxx–cxxi; 
Catherine to Aleksei G. Orlov, 6 May and 11 August 1769, SIRIO 1 (1867): 19, 23. 
4 A relic of private naval warfare, privateers were understood by a canon of Western jurists as 
privately-owned vessels engaged in a public act of war. On the development of this legal regime, see 
N. A. M. Rodger, “The Law and Language of Private Naval Warfare,” The Mariner’s Mirror 100, no. 1 
(2014): 5–16. 
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flag, an assumption also conveyed semantically through Panin’s choice of the word 
okhotnik in 1769.5 When this endeavor proved ineffective, the Russian government 
expressed a clearer, more specific notion of privateers that it recruited to join its war 
efforts. Tentatively at first, Russian bureaucrats, naval personnel, and admiralty 
courts attempted to define the nature and expectations of that relationship by 
adjusting their vocabulary, recruitment tactics, remuneration, and regulation of these 
combatants – a process that continued well into the 1790s.  
Ultimately, the government adapted elements of two longstanding Russian 
practices – recruitment of foreigners into Russian service and deployment of irregular 
troops – to create a conceptual and legal framework in which privateers would 
become comprehensible within Russia’s social structures. For this reason, in imperial 
Russia the starting point for understanding such combatants was not the legal 
ownership of their vessels but the underlying relationship between these persons and 
the Russian state. Russian privateers, though nowhere near in number as those 
operating under British, French, or Dutch flags, reflected a different mechanism by 
which the Russian government would control this subset of its armed forces – 
through legal instruments and individual incentives as opposed to strict military 
discipline and semi-autonomous estate privileges. They represented a third, albeit 
seldom-used, type of combatant used by the Russian armed forces. 
The search for a conceptual formulation of a privateer under the Russian flag 
came amidst a host of changes to the old Muscovite social and political order, which 
was built on military service that Russian subjects owed to the tsar.6 Two social 
groups that had a notable presence within imperial Russia’s military apparatus were 
central to this shifting political framework: the courtly elite was involved in an ongoing 
dialogue with the ruling monarchs about reforms to the social and political order while 
the Russian bureaucracy tried to understand how groups that had historically fallen 
outside the tsar’s remit fit into that very order. Among the ongoing societal 
transformations, the 1762 emancipation of the nobility from state service was one 
notable change that called for a new ethos among the Russian officer corps, 
observable through, among other dimensions, a fresh look at merit and talent as the 
basis for promotion.7 The broad discussions around advancement in the military 
hierarchy incorporated the nobility’s own new discursive strategies of articulating why 
officers who were no longer obliged to serve the state continued (or ought to 
continue) to do so. The ideology of state service pervaded the Russian polity’s 
relations with multiple groups of foreign subjects as well, as evident in the ambiguous 
status of Russia’s long-time military allies on the Eurasian steppe that was 
nevertheless frequently painted in imperial and hegemonic terms by the Russian 
                                                             
5 In eighteenth-century Russian this term used to designate “volunteer” also means “enthusiast,” 
suggesting that the Russian chancellors saw in these voluntaries more than mere willingness, but 
rather an ardent desire for service to the Russian Empire. For eighteenth-century meanings and usage 
see “Okhotnik,” Slovar’ russkogo iazyka XVIII veka 19 vols. (St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2011) 18: 147-48. 
(The term’s third meaning is “hunter,” which also seems apt to describe commerce raiders, but was 
not the meaning intended by Panin since it also applied to volunteers in infantry forces and was used 
interchangeably with voluntëry – calqued from “voluntary” and its cognates.) 
6 For an overview of the political order of early-modern Russia and military obligations, see the 
excellent essays in Frederick W. Kagan and Robin Higham, eds., The Military History of Tsarist Russia 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008); Richard Hellie, Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1971); John Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia, 
1462-1874 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985). 
7 Eugene Miakinkov, “‘Your Excellency Needs Only to Wish It’: Awards and Promotion Culture in the 
Army of Catherine II,” Russian Review 75 (July 2016): 457–76. 
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bureaucracy.8 As I show in this chapter, these very questions of state ideology and 
political order underlay the Russian approach to organizing its forces at sea and lie at 
the root of the difficulties of transposing the practice of privateering into Russian 
society. 
Russia’s sanction of privateers points not to a “Westernization” in Russia’s 
armed forces (as much of the traditional historiography of the military in this period 
assumes), for government-backed commerce-raiding was not a Western 
phenomenon even if discussions over its legality took place within the discourse of 
European law, but to wide changes in Russian political culture in the final third of the 
eighteenth century. Although privateers were by no means a litmus test for changes 
in Russian society, they offer an opportunity to place Russia’s participation in the 
European maritime legal regime and the empire’s organization of its military force – 
two big questions that underlie the recent flurry of academic scholarship on privateers 
– in historical perspective.9 Because the Anglophone historiography of imperial 
Russian sea forces has been so focused on technical modernization and foreign 
expertise, we know little about the political and cultural aspects of naval ideology. But 
by turning to privateers, the Russian elite signaled changes in Russian political 
culture just as much as a shift in Russia’s approach to naval warfare. 
While privateering has been a prominent topic of research in European, and 
especially British, historiography, it has been nearly invisible in Russian 
historiography and histories of Russia. For a variety of ideological reasons, the 
question has not merited much interest among historians in the late imperial and 
Soviet periods. For one, many commerce-raiders under the Russian flag were not 
Russian subjects, which rendered them of little interest to patriotic naval historians.10 
Moreover, as in other historical contexts, the strategic contribution of privateers to the 
outcome of any war was unclear. Privateers in the Russian-Ottoman wars attempted 
to disrupt food supplies to Constantinople – a strategy even Catherine II doubted as 
being effective – and to divert at least some of the Ottoman Empire’s naval forces 
away from the Black Sea.11 From the point of view of naval strategic scholarship, 
these reasons alone offered little reason to study them. On the other hand, Russian-
flagged commerce raiders of Eastern Mediterranean origins were subsumed into the 
pre-history of the Greek revolution, as brave combatants against the Ottoman Empire 
who paved the way to a large-scale rebellion and Greek liberation.12 Both narratives 
                                                             
8 Gregory Afinogenov, “Languages of Hegemony on the Eighteenth-Century Kazakh Steppe,” 
International History Review (June 2018): 1–19. DOI: 10.1080/07075332.2018.1475403. 
9 Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial 
Violence in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Lauren Benton, “Legal 
Spaces of Empire: Piracy and the Origins of Ocean Regionalism,” Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 47, no. 4 (October 2005): 700–724; Sarah V. Percy, Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in 
International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Alejandro Colás and Bryan Mabee, 
eds., Mercenaries, Pirates, Bandits and Empires: Private Violence in Historical Context (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010); David Parrott, The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military 
Revolution in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
10 For representative scholarship, see F. F. Veselago, Kratkaia istoriia Russkago flota (St. Petersburg: 
Tipografiia V. Demakova, 1893); E. V. Tarle, Tri ekspeditsii russkogo flota (Moscow: Voennoe 
izdatel’stvo, 1956); L. G. Beskrovnyi, Russkaia armiia i flot v XVIII veke: ocherki. (Moscow: Voennoe 
izdatel'stvo, 1958): 460-521. 
11 M. S. Anderson, “Russia in the Mediterranean, 1788-1791: A Little-Known Chapter in the History of 
Naval Warfare and Privateering,” The Mariner’s Mirror 45, no. 1 (1959): 34. 
12 G. L. Arsh, Rossiia i borʹba Gretsii za osvobozhdenie: ot Ekateriny II do Nikolaia I: ocherki (Moscow: 
Indrik, 2013); Arsh, Eteristskoe dvizhenie v Rossii (Moscow: Nauka, 1970); Nicholas Charles Pappas, 
Greeks in Russian Military Service in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries 
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have overlooked the imperial dimension of Russian policy where this story surely 
belongs. 
There are also several semantic ambiguities in Russian terminology and 
usage that have rendered the activities of many would-be privateers invisible in the 
historical record, preventing a systematic examination of this phenomenon in the 
Russian context. First, both the source material and secondary scholarship make 
frequent mention of cruisers (kreisery), meaning all ships that patrolled sea-lanes and 
sought to intercept and disrupt enemy trade and communications, without 
differentiating between the different kinds of ships or crews involved in the action.13 
The distinction may not have been material to the strategic outcome, but as we shall 
see below, it was significant to the combatants themselves. Second, eighteenth-
century Russian was imprecise in its terminology, employing cognates of European 
words that had distinct legal meanings in their original contexts to refer to the same 
idea.14 Eighteenth-century Russian parlance included cognates of the English 
“privateer” (privator), the Dutch “kaper” (kaper), French “armateur” and “corsair” 
(armator, korsar), all of which were used interchangeably in historical documents 
without much consideration of the historical origin of the term. The Naval Statute of 
1720 made reference to kapery who had equal standing with Russian ships of war 
(voinskie korabli).15 By the second half of the eighteenth century new words – many 
of French origin – largely supplanted the use of kaper.16 Panin used the word armator 
in the letter cited above, but in drawing up its Rules for Privateers (Pravila dlia 
partikuliarnykh korsarov), the Admiralty employed the term korsary to describe those 
enlisting to fight the Ottoman Empire.17 Lest one think this cognate made reference to 
the overt religious symbolism of the war, the term korsary was transposed to the 
Baltic theater when privateers (partikuliarnye korsary) were invited to prey on 
Swedish commerce.18 This multiplicity of terminology in Russian vernacular and 
official usage points to the fact that in Russia the idea of a privateer was well 
understood and existed in the abstract before it acquired any meaningful distinction 
from irregular or auxiliary troops in practice.  
The eventual emergence and development of privateers as a separate social 
category in imperial Russia could be observed in three ways: in the specific 
vocabulary referring to concrete activities perpetrated at sea under the Russian flag; 
in distinct financial incentives that were codified only during the 1787 Russian-
Ottoman war; and, in the use of legal instruments and law-based strategies employed 
to regulate the activities of this specific subclass of combatant. The argument in this 
chapter begins with an explanation of the historical role of irregular troops in Russian 
strategy to show how this precedent was first used to organize recruits in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. It then pivots to an overview of Russia’s approach to commerce-
                                                             
(Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1991). For an overview see Lucien J. Frary, Russia and the 
Making of Modern Greek Identity, 1821-1844 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 20-27. 
13 Instructions to Russian ships of the line, frigates, and accompanying vessels all used the verb “to 
cruise,” reinforcing the idea that all naval auxiliaries engaged in the same kinds of activities. 
14 For precise legal meanings of commerce-raider terminology in historical context, see Rodger, “The 
Law and Language of Private Naval Warfare.”  
15 Morskoi Ustav Book IV, Chapter 4, §5. Published in Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii 
(hereafter, PSZ), ser. 1, no. 3485, 13 January 1720. 
16 On the profound impact of the French language on Russian culture and society in the second half of 
the eighteenth century, see Derek Offord et al., eds., French and Russian in Imperial Russia, 2 vols., 
Russian Language and Society (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015). 
17 PSZ, ser. 1, no. 16,599, 31 December 1787. 
18 PSZ, ser. 1, no. 16,708, 10 September 1788. 
 5 
raiding and the changes that followed in the 1770s and 1780s. The final part argues 
that these developments set privateers apart from both foreign recruits and irregular 
troops. 
 
“Irregular troops and regular warriors, as well as Greeks serving in our fleet”  
Military service in imperial Russia, like other obligations, was determined by one’s 
social status. Subjects of the tsar belonged to social groups called sosloviia (singular: 
soslovie), each of which came with a unique set of privileges and obligations owed to 
the sovereign in exchange for those privileges. Although we mainly think of four 
major estates when describing the social structure of Russian society – nobility, 
clergy, merchants, and peasants – in reality, there were many more. Social 
categories were created not only from social classes of people or professions, but 
sometimes from localities or discrete communities (e.g. Cossacks).19 Military 
obligations cut across the estates in several ways. With the introduction of the Table 
of Ranks in 1722, nobles owed a lifetime of service to the tsar in either a military or 
civil capacity. This expectation abated over the next few decades until 1762, when 
nobles were released from the obligation to serve, although most continued to do so. 
Peasants (serfs) provided the pool for army and naval recruitment.20 In addition to the 
regular army and navy, the state also conscripted large numbers of irregular forces 
from non-Russian communities in the borderlands. The military obligations of 
Cossacks, Tatars, Bashkirs, Kalmyks and others were determined by the specific 
agreements these communities negotiated as part of their integration into the imperial 
fold.21  
More than just a matter of existential and military necessity, the state’s 
incorporation of frontier communities into the Russian military structure was an 
imperial tactic as well. The gradual creation of a new military elite at the head of 
these former nomadic communities proved to be a successful mechanism of 
integrating non-Russian subject populations into the Russian Empire.22 The idea of 
                                                             
19 Janet Hartley, A Social History of the Russian Empire, 1650-1825 (London: Longman, 1999), 28–
76; Alison K. Smith, For the Common Good and Their Own Well-Being: Social Estates in Imperial 
Russia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 4–12; Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter, Social Identity in 
Imperial Russia (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1997).  As Gregory Freeze has argued, 
group identity had not fully coalesced until the nineteenth century, and in the eighteenth century 
societal structures were still evolving. See his “The Soslovie (Estate) Paradigm and Russian Social 
History,” American Historical Review 91, no. 1 (February 1986): 11-36.  
20 On military obligations, see Janet Hartley, Russia, 1762-1825: Military Power, the State, and the 
People (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008); Hartley, A Social History of the Russian Empire, 1650-1825; 
Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter, From Serf to Russian Soldier (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1989); Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar. 
21 For an overview of the incorporation process, see Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier: 
The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-1800 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 
especially 126-83. For studies of individual groups, on Bashkirs see Charles Steinwedel, Threads of 
Empire: Loyalty and Tsarist Authority in Bashkiria, 1552-1917 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2016); Robert F. Baumann, “Subject Nationalities in the Military Service of Imperial Russia: The Case 
of the Bashkirs,” Slavic Review 46, no. 3/4 (Autumn-Winter 1987): 489–502; on Cossacks, see Brian 
J. Boeck, Imperial Boundaries: Cossack Communities and Empire-Building in the Age of Peter the 
Great (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); on Kalmyks, see Michael Khodarkovsky, 
Where Two Worlds Met: The Russian State and the Kalmyk Nomads, 1600-1771 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1992). 
22 Kelly A. O’Neill, “Between Subversion and Submission: The Intergration of the Crimean Khanate 
into the Russian Empire, 1783-1853” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 2006), 148–210; Michael 
Khodarkovsky, “The Indigenous Elites and the Construction of Ethnic Identities in the North 
Caucasus,” Russian History 35, no. 2 (2008): 129–38; Baumann, “Subject Nationalities in the Military 
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using ethnic regiments in particular roles in the southern and steppe frontiers 
extended to new settlers in the eighteenth century. Serbian settlers to Russia’s 
southern provinces in the 1750s were formed into nationality-based regiments and 
assigned the defense of the frontiers of New Serbia (Novoserbiia) and Slavic Serbia 
(Slavianoserbiia).23 These conventions continued with the regiments formed by 
migrants and refugees from Ottoman territories who settled in southern Russia in the 
1770s. Initially known as the Albanian Irregular Battalions (Albanskie irreguliarnye 
batal’ony), these regiments were renamed Greek Infantry Battalions (Grecheskie 
pekhotnye batal’ony) in the late 1770s.24 By all accounts, the actual ethnic 
composition of any of these regiments was indeterminate and of little interest to the 
imperial administration, but the practice perpetuated the link between social groups 
and specific military roles.  
In 1770, when the first Russian naval squadrons arrived in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, Russian naval command organized irregular troops, naval auxiliaries, 
and volunteers in the region according to the same ethnic logic. As we know from 
their reports, circulars, and muster rolls, Russian naval leaders understood local 
troops through several categories: regular forces (riadovye voiska), irregular forces 
(nereguliarnye voiska), volunteers (volontëry), Albanians (albantsy), and Greeks 
(greki). Russian ship rosters included ethnic categories as stand-ins for particular 
ranks or functions, noting the numbers of Greeks, Slavonians, Maltese, or Arabs on 
board.25 Some orders even directed squadron leaders to group sailors by ethnicity, 
with all Greeks crewing one ship and Slavonians another.26 It is not clear that the 
latter two categories were necessarily different from irregular forces, as the 
“Albanians,” usually marine infantry units, were organized into special irregular 
battalions with a distinctive organizational structure.27 If albantsy referred to the 
marine infantry troops, the term “Greeks” was used synonymously with sailors on 
Russian vessels or captains of auxiliary boats. The usage is inconsistent, but the 
documents reference “Greeks,” “Greeks with patents,” and in one instance a “cruiser 
from among the Greeks.”28 The term “Greek” is also misleading as it was often used 
in reference to any Ottoman Christian, mainly from the Aegean archipelago, who was 
hired to crew a Russian ship or to assist Russian naval operations with his own 
                                                             
Service of Imperial Russia: The Case of the Bashkirs”; John Keep, “The Origins of Russian Militarism,” 
Cahiers Du Monde Russe et Soviétique 26, no. 1 (1985): 10. 
23 I. I. Leshchilovskaia, Serbskii narod i Rossiia v XVIII veke (St. Petersburg: Aleteia, 2006), 39, 256–
58; Roger Bartlett, Human Capital: The Settlement of Foreigners in Russia, 1762-1804 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), 18–21. 
24  Pappas, Greeks in Russian Military Service, 79–84; Beskrovnyi, Russkaia armiia i flot v XVIII veke, 
313. 
25 See for example muster rolls in RGAVMF f. 188 (Chancellery of Rear-Admiral Elmanov) op. 1 ll. 21-
22ob, 32-33, 262. 
26 RGAVMF f. 190 op. 1 d. 56 ll. 15, 59-59ob. 
27 The term albanets was synonymous with arnaut, a Turkish loan word meaning “Albanian” and used 
in reference to Balkan soldiers serving in the Ottoman army. Smilianskaia, Rossiia v 
Sredizemnomor’e, 22-23; G. L. Arsh, “Albania: Rost separatizma mestnykh vlastitelei,” in Istoriia 
Balkan: vek vosemnadtsatyi, ed. V. N. Vinogradov (Moscow: Nauka, 2004), 486. The geographical 
conception of Albania was indeterminate, often simply a reference to the Balkan peninsula. The 
contrast was largely between the insular populations of the Aegean and the inhabitants of the Balkan 
mainland. On the distinctive organizing structure, see Radi Boev, “Voenno-politicheskoe 
sotrudnichestvo mezhdu balkanskimi narodami i Rossiiei v khode russko-turetskoi voiny 1768-1774 
godov,” Études Balkaniques, no. 2 (1975): 118–27. 
28 See, for example, Petition of Angeli Ladiko, Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov 
(RGADA) f. 10 (Cabinet of Catherine II) op. 1 d. 620 l. 26; Smilianskaia, Rossiia v Sredizemnomor’e, 
137-38, 189 n.177. 
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vessel.29 The attempt to correlate social identities with specific roles was ultimately 
fruitless, as Admiral Grigorii A. Spiridov’s mouthful of an address to the “leaders of 
the irregular troops and regular warriors, as well as Greeks serving in our fleet, and 
others irregular troops, who deign to assist your squadrons, and the Greeks on those 
ships” suggests.30 
Compensation for naval auxiliaries in the 1768-1774 Russian-Ottoman war 
remained unclear throughout the conflict and for over a decade after the conclusion 
of the peace treaty, making the financial incentives for naval auxiliaries that emerged 
in the 1780s a distinctly notable change. Various classes of irregular troops had until 
December 1771 “received and demanded wages from the treasury, some more and 
others less,” an indeterminate state of events that Spiridov put to an end in a 
proclamation issued on 5 December 1771. In a circular to all squadrons in the 
Eastern Mediterranean he announced that “no one serving as a sailor, either 
Albanian or of whatever nation,” on any Russian or auxiliary ship would receive more 
than one chervonets per month with a standard allotment of provisions.31 Spiridov 
was almost certainly referring exclusively to the infantry regiments on board Russian 
ships, as most naval auxiliaries serving on their own ships assured the Russian 
government that they had entered Russian service in 1770 as “voluntaries” (na 
sobstvennom koshte, voluntery). Notably, some records suggest that monthly wages 
were allocated even to the ordinary sailors but not to any of the senior personnel on 
auxiliary vessels.32 
As auxiliary captains assisting the Russian navy received no remuneration 
from the treasury, one might assume they supported themselves and recruited crews 
with the spoils of war. To incite compliance with Russia’s own regulations, the acting 
commander in the Eastern Mediterranean Grigorii Spiridov announced to all “irregular 
troops, majors, captains, lieutenants, ensigns, and ordinary troops” that they will 
receive “wages according to their merits” and all those who “bravely acted against the 
enemy and remained in good standing” without committing acts of “illegal plunder” 
would be duly rewarding according to the regulations.33 Indeed, the records of the 
kriegsrekht (war tribunal), which adjudicated prizes among its other judicial functions, 
show many instances of “Greeks with patents” and other ship commanders hauling in 
merchant vessels to be condemned as prizes. The proceedings were conducted 
according to Russia’s Naval Statute of 1720 which, fifty years after its introduction, 
still provided the only guidance on distribution of prize money for Russian courts. The 
Naval Statute offered little commentary on naval auxiliaries except to state that 
privateers (partikuliarnye liudi, kapery) had the same rights as naval personnel to 
capture ships.34 According to this foundational document, those rights included one-
tenth of the value of the prize going to the commander of the ship, with other shares 
of one-tenth allocated to ranks of admiral and flagman, and the remainder reserved 
                                                             
29 On the overlapping linguistic, religious and professional implications of the term “Greek” in this 
period, see Roumiana Mihneva, “Les ‘Grecs’ et le commerce entre les Balkans et la Russie (milieu 
XVIIe-milieu XVIIIe s.). Des privilèges à la crise,” Études Balkaniques, no. 1 (1990): 80–99; Traian 
Stoianovich, “The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant,” Journal of Economic History 20, no. 2 
(June 1960): 234–313. Judging from the usage in Russian correspondence, to the naval leadership it 
also meant “sailor.” 
30 RGAVMF f. 188 op. 1 d. 38 l. 80.  
31 RGAVMF f. 188 op. 1 d. 38 ll. 81-81ob. 
32 RGADA f. 10 op. 1 d. 644 ll. 321-322. 
33 RGAVMF f. 188 op. 1 d. 38 ll. 82-82ob. 
34 Morskoi Ustav Book IV, Chapter 4, §5; Reglament o upravlenii Admiralteistva i verfi i chast’ vtoraia 
Reglamenta Morskago Chapter I, §100 (published in PSZ ser. 1, no. 3937, 5 April 1722). 
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for the other officers and sailors.35 However, as the proceedings of the prize 
commission reveal, “Greeks” were seldom rewarded for their attacks on Ottoman 
commerce. Desperate for provisions, the tribunal confiscated most foodstuffs for the 
commissary and high-value items for the treasury.36 Of the prize items that went to 
the public auctions, I came across only one instance where the prize commission 
ruled that one-tenth of the prize amount should be paid to the “Greek” who made the 
capture.37 
 
“For brave and excellent services rendered” 
In organizing irregular troops in the Eastern Mediterranean, the state drew on the 
Russian imperial model that had transformed peripheral military allies into loyal 
servitors and subjects of the Russian state. In the case of other irregular troops such 
as the Cossacks and the Bashkirs, the obligatory nature of their military service was 
reinforced with imperial decrees to produce troops under the coercive threat of the 
government’s own land forces or other infringements on their semi-autonomous 
lifestyle.38 On the other hand, excellence in service to the tsar by the borderland 
communities was compensated with lavish rewards and additional privileges.39 The 
Eastern Mediterranean combatants, on the other hand, were invited to serve through 
proclamations issued by Catherine and Spiridov, and sometimes recruited by local 
agents.40 Under the assumption that they held interests similar to the Russian state, 
local recruits were incorporated into the Russian armed forces to serve the Russian 
monarch. However it soon became clear that there was a mismatch of expectations 
between the government and these auxiliary troops. 
The naval auxiliaries of the 1768 war were not only denied prize rewards at 
the hands of the prize commissions during the war, but they were dealt a further blow 
in 1777 when the Admiralty College deemed them ineligible for any of the rewards 
outlined in the Naval Statute. As was Russian practice, after the conclusion of the 
1768 war, the Admiralty College appointed a special commission to calculate the 
prize shares for all participants of the Archipelago Expedition. The Admiralty 
Commission’s calculations were based on the schedule of actions outlined in the 
Naval Statute, which included burning of enemy vessels, as the Russians had done 
in the Battle of Çeşme. The admiralty’s allocation of rewards was based on rank and 
made use of the muster rolls provided by each squadron commander. In 
contravention of Spiridov’s earlier promises, the commission excluded all auxiliary 
troops on Spiridov’s rosters, arguing that the “rewards [were] authorized by the Naval 
                                                             
35 Morskoi Ustav, Book IV, Chapter 6, §1-3. 
36 Spiridov even commented in a report to Panin from 2 July 1770 that his squadron was able to 
overcome the loss of a fabulous amount of 132,000 guilders in bills of exchange (veksel) and the 
treasury aboard a burned ship, the fleet had almost no need for supply or money, as they collected 
provisions from prizes. Materialy dlia istorii flota (hereafter, MIRF) 11: 562. 
37 For the payment of one-tenth of the prize money to Fedor Murza see “Drafts of prize commission 
decisions for September 1772,” RGAVMF f. 42 (Admiralty Commission in Naoussa in 1768-1774 
Russian-Ottoman War) op. 1 d. 129 ll. 36ob-37, 38-39. Compare to Rizo’s captures from March 1772 
where there is no mention of any such reward, RGAVMF f. 42 op. 1 d. 21. 
38 Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 125–26; Steinwedel, Threads of Empire, 56.  
39 Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 127. 
40 Catherine II’s manifesto, 29 January 1769, Institut Rossiiskoi Istorii Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk 
(hereafter, SPb II RAN) f. 184 op. 1 d. 2; Manifestos from February 1768, RGADA f. 15 (Diplomatic 
Department) op. 1 d. 226; Boev, “Voenno-politicheskoe sotrudnichestvo.” 
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Statute for naval personnel” and that the “irregular troops... included in Admiral 
Spiridov’s lists [were] ineligible for these rewards.”41 
The commission’s purposeful exclusion of auxiliary captains did not go 
unnoticed, and lack of remuneration for their service was the central complaint of 
dozens upon dozens of petitions submitted to the Russian empress in the 1770s and 
1780s.42 Petitioners, armed with certificates of service from Russian commanders 
attesting to the “brave and excellent services rendered,” itemized their contributions 
to the Russian war effort.43 One petitioner claimed that the Ottoman vessels he 
captured contained up to 11,800 chetverty of grain, which were turned over to the 
Russian commissary “in a time of deficit of grain for feeding the troops.” He estimated 
the total value of his captures, in vessels burned and provisions seized, as about 
115,000 rubles.44 Another petitioner, Ioannis Varvakis, explained that he “was sent 
on various missions to the farthest reaches of Ottoman lands by Admiral Spiridov in 
his own vessel.... One time in the Archipelago waters, [he] caught a Turkish prize, 
laden with all sorts of goods costing more than 25,000 rubles. Preserving them in full, 
[he] delivered them to Her Majesty’s Treasury to Admiral Spiridov, who surrendered 
them to the Commissary.”45 Even Fedor Murza, who was the only Greek auxiliary 
with a documented prize reward in the prescribed one-tenth share, petitioned the 
empress for further monetary recognition of his service and use of his own ship 
“following the example of his compatriots.”46 
Notable for their linguistic and formulaic similarities, the petitions walked a fine 
line between the petitioners’ expressed subservience to the Russian monarch, who 
they claimed was their protector, and the voluntary nature of their exceptional service 
to the “August Monarchess.” Although my focus remains on commerce raiders, the 
deeds outlined in the sources include translation work, prisoner exchange, supplies, 
and in one instance even a foiling an assassination attempt on Aleksei Orlov’s life.47 
Strikingly, while most petitioners emphasized their personal investment in the war 
and support of large crews, none of the petitioners ever referred to himself as a 
privateer or argued that he was legally entitled to prize money. On the contrary, 
Varvakis stated that he did not ask for rewards for the prizes he took because he did 
not know the “Russian custom.”48 Eventually, most petitioners were granted a sum 
between 200 and 600 rubles as a token of Russian generosity, not as outright 
recognition of Russian obligation for their service.49 
In this respect, the Russian government took a different approach to 
compensating naval auxiliaries, whom it now understood to be as privateers, in the 
1787 war. If previously the Russian government sought to exploit a perceived natural 
predisposition towards Russia among warriors and sailors in the Mediterranean 
region, the evidence from the 1780s points to efforts to incentivize commerce raiders 
with generous rewards, far more lavish than the prizes described in the Naval Statute 
                                                             
41 RGAVMF f. 243 (Chancellery of Commander of Black Sea Fleet and Ports) op. 1 d. 5012 ll. 92ob-
93. 
42 These petitions, numbering several dozen, are held in RGADA f. 10 op. 1 dd. 644, 645, 676. 
43 For examples of testimonials of service see RGADA f. 10 op. 1 d. 644 l. 322; RGADA f. 10 op. 1 d. 
645 l. 66. 
44 One chetvert of grain equals about 210 liters or just under 6 bushels. RGADA f. 10 op. 1 d. 644 l. 
52. 
45 RGADA f. 10 op.1 d. 644 l. 128. 
46 RGADA f. 10 op. 1 d. 644 ll. 321-322. 
47 For the foiled assassination, see RGADA f. 10 op. 1 d. 645 ll. 143-150ob. 
48 RGADA f. 10 op. 1 d. 644 ll. 128-128ob. 
49 RGADA f. 10 op. 1 d. 645 ll. 158-168. 
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of 1720. The highest rewards were offered to combatants who armed and sailed their 
own ships and did not draw government salaries. Article 9 of a document issued in 
the early months of the war, the Rules for Privateers, allocated nine-tenths of the 
value of a vessel and goods to the privateer and his crew, with one-tenth going to the 
treasury. A separate article offered compensation of 5 rubles for every prisoner of 
war taken from an enemy vessel.50 Other individuals recruited for Russia’s war efforts 
received different prize terms, reflecting different terms of service. We will consider 
these differences in the next section. 
 
“To prevent their undertaking anything contrary to these principles” 
The government’s new vision for private maritime combatants extended beyond 
clearly articulated financial incentives; characteristically for Catherine II’s reign, they 
were rooted in international legal norms and legal institutions.51 Legal themes also 
prevailed in the emerging public sphere through art, theater, publication, and 
literature.52 Despite the fundamental tension between the autocracy and the law, 
legal institutions acquired greater relevance in interpreting Russian laws and the 
monarch’s will in this period.53 For the first time in its history the Russian government 
created its own institutions to disseminate and reinforce the legal norms that were 
intended to control and restrain privateer actions.54 Legal-administrative approaches 
that facilitated an evolution towards a different kind of combatant also included 
individual contracts between privateers and the Russian state, and benefited from a 
changed attitude towards state service and personal property.55 Building on the 
experience of the 1768-1774 Russian-Ottoman war, fundamental questions in 
understanding and defining privateers in Russian political and naval practice that 
arose throughout the final third of the eighteenth century were filtered through 
changing ideas and conceptual transformations in Russia more broadly.   
The government’s vision of private armed ships hunting enemy commerce was 
articulated in the 1787 Rules for Privateers – a document that laid out the practical 
mechanisms of these endeavors in twenty-seven statutes. While offering lucrative 
financial incentives, the document relied on elements common to European practice 
to regulate privateers: bond requirements to receive a patent, universal instructions 
for treatment of enemy and neutral vessels, and a legal requirement to account for 
the circumstances of the capture in front of a prize court.56 The newly developed 
                                                             
50 PSZ, ser. 1, no. 16,599, 31 December 1787. 
51 Emphasis on legal rhetoric and images of justice was a hallmark of the reign of Catherine II. 
Attributed to Catherine’s “enlightened absolutism,” projects such as the “Instructions to the Legislative 
Commission of 1767,” the creation of the Court of Conscience, incisive reading of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, and a whole host of symbolic imagery have highlighted the 
importance of legalism to the monarch herself. On these projects see Madariaga, Russia in the Age of 
Catherine the Great, 139-150; Marc Raeff, “The Empress and the Vinerian Professor: Catherine II’s 
Projects of Government Reforms and Blackstone’s Commentaries,” Oxford Slavonic Papers VII 
(1974): 18–41. 
52 Wortman, Scenarios of Power, 110-46; Elise Wirtschafter, The Play of Ideas in Russian 
Enlightenment Theater (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003), 129-138. 
53 For example, there were analogous developments in property and inheritance law. See Michelle 
Lamarche Marrese, A Woman’s Kingdom: Noblewomen and the Control of Property in Russia, 1700-
1861 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002). 
54 Julia Leikin, “‘The Prostitution of the Russian Flag’: Privateers in Russian Admiralty Courts, 1787-
1798,” Law and History Review 35, no. 4 (November 2017): 1049-1081. 
55 Richard Pipes, “Private Property Comes to Russia: The Reign of Catherine II,” in Cultures and 
Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk, ed. Zvi Gitelman et al. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 2000), 431–42. 
56 PSZ, ser. 1, no. 16,599, 31 December 1787. 
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system drew on the symbolic legal power of patents, prize commissions, and 
plenipotentiaries to conceptualize the relationship between the Russian Empire and 
these combatants. Contracts and patents defined the privateers’ connection to the 
Russian state rather than qualifying a preexisting relationship. Through these legal 
instruments introduced to control privateers, the Russian Empire extended its 
admiralty jurisdiction through the Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean Seas. Focusing on 
law and international norms, and relying on a wide network of consular jurisdiction 
and neutral allies, the Rules for Privateers ushered in a new relationship between the 
government and privately armed combatants that marked them as different from 
other Russian troops. This relationship was contractual, rather than a form of 
“imperial citizenship.”57 For the most part, privateers now fell outside of the 
paternalistic relationship with the monarch and the strictures of traditional military 
discipline, even if some contracts implied that misdeeds would be punished 
according to the Naval Statute.58 The Naval Statute prescribed standards of behavior 
for Russia’s naval forces, allowing war tribunals and other admiralty courts to 
administer punishment in the event of criminal or disciplinary infractions. Not subject 
to the Naval Statute, privateers for the most part evaded any disciplinary measures 
Russian naval officers and sailors faced. Even the crew in Guglielmo Lorenzi’s flotilla 
faced no criminal penalties for deserting their posts in favor of joining Lambros 
Katsonis’s crew (Lorenzi’s contract stated that he was to abide by both the Naval 
Statute and the Rules for Privateers).59 Unlike sailors who deserted their service and 
faced the strict penalties of the Naval Statute, the only punishment deserters from 
Lorenzi’s flotilla faced was to see their prize money withheld.60 Privateers were also 
beyond the Russian Empire’s use of law and practices of allegiance that required 
military service from some subject populations in exchange for rights and privileges. 
In the case of irregular troops, in most cases the communities retained rights to 
customary legal self-regulation as part of their semi-autonomous status. Community 
elders were held responsible for the behavior of their subordinates and fined for their 
infractions.61 It is unclear whether any crimes by irregular troops were prosecuted 
according to the Military Statute of 1716, the Naval Statute’s land army analogue, in 
addition to their own customary laws. As for privateers, it became abundantly clear in 
the 1787-1791 Russian-Ottoman war that the Russian government lacked any 
disciplinary and coercive means to regulate them, rendering it entirely dependent on 
the legal mechanisms outlined in the Rules for Privateers.62 
The problem of control over privateers was compounded by a related legal 
question: what legal authority did the Russian Empire have over foreign subjects 
outside of its sovereign realm? Although the Rules for Privateers in the preamble 
imagined a patriotic fervor among “loyal subjects” eager to arm their vessels “to begin 
                                                             
57 On this model, see Jane Burbank, “An Imperial Rights Regime: Law and Citizenship in the Russian 
Empire,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 7, no. 3 (2006): 397–431. 
58 Only some contracts suggested that privateers would be subject to the discipline of the Naval 
Statute, and in practice that was never enforced. On military justice, see Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter, 
“Military Justice and Social Relations in the Pre-reform Army, 1796-1855,” Slavic Review, 44, no. 1 
(Spring 1985): 67-82; on the cultural norms and deviation from those norms of the naval officer corps, 
see E. M. Lupanova, Offitserskii korpus russkogo flota: norma i deviatsiia povsednevnoi zhizni, 1768-
1812 gg. (St. Petersburg: Lema, 2011). 
59 Gibbs to Bezborodko, 11 August 1789, MIRF 13: 568-69. 
60 RGADA f. 10 op. 1 d. 676 l. 136. 
61 Steinwedel, Threads of Empire, 56. 
62 Consider the numerous complaints from Gibbs to officials in St. Petersburg, RGAVMF f. 150 op. 1 d. 
97 ll. 46ob, 49ob, 51ob, 60ob, 189ob, 194ob-196ob. 
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searches for enemy vessels, both military and merchant,” in reality few of the persons 
they were intended to regulate were Russian subjects.  With the exception of 
Lambros Katsonis, Russia’s most notorious privateer, and a handful of other captains 
fitted out in the Black Sea ports at the beginning of the 1787 Russian-Ottoman war, 
few irregular naval combatants and commerce raiders were subjects of the tsar. Most 
were recruited in the Eastern Mediterranean by the respective flotilla captains and 
Russian naval commanders. Some evidence even suggests that the government 
feigned allowing its own subjects to privateer to encourage foreign captains in the 
Mediterranean region to accept Russian commissions.63 So if being a privateer had 
little to do with practicing imperial citizenship, then the state had only the prescriptive 
power of international norms to control the private maritime violence it sanctioned. 
The relationship between the privateer and the state was established through a 
patent – essentially the equivalent of a letter of marque or a commission – that would 
allow privateers to raise naval ensigns on their ships. In Russia, patents were generic 
documents issued to signify any rank or manner of government service. While 
patents were generic, contracts that at times accompanied them were notable for 
their diverseness. Contracted foreign naval talent formed a spectrum between the 
Western model of a private combatant and state naval forces. Where one stood on 
the Russian commerce-raiding spectrum could be gleaned from highly individualized 
contracts addressing particular demands or interests of the privateer. For instance, in 
the summer of 1788, senior Russian officials contracted three Corsican captains, 
veterans of the British fleet at Gibraltar, to join Russian forces. The contract the 
Corsican captains signed allowed them to form a battalion consisting solely of other 
Corsicans, complete with its own priest. Their contract also promised an enlistment 
bonus of 6 chervonnyi to be paid to every recruit, as well as compensation, table 
money, uniforms, and ordnance equivalent to that received by regular Russian 
sailors. The Corsicans were also promised a pension of 200 rubles per year if they 
were injured in the line of duty.64 The notorious Maltese corsair Guglielmo Lorenzi 
recruited in 1789 to command a flotilla in the Mediterranean was also given a 
separate contract and set of instructions that stipulated his terms of service: his 
infractions would be punished according to the Naval Statute – the same legal code 
that applied to Russian naval officers and crew – although he was simultaneously 
expected to abide by the Rules for Privateers. However, contrary to the Rules, 
Lorenzi’s division of prize money would be radically different. At the discretion of the 
prize commission, members of his flotilla would divide one-third of the value of their 
prizes while two-thirds would go to the treasury.65 
Russian privateers existed on a spectrum, in variety of different contractual 
models that differentiated them from one another, but also made them different from 
other kinds of foreign and irregular troops in the Russian Empire. The differences 
between the arrangements made by the privateers themselves suggest that in 
Russian law it was not the financial and legal arrangements that determined who was 
a privateer but rather a more abstract quality assessed by the government: the ethos 
of service. Russia’s relationship with commerce-raiders was often fraught with the 
                                                             
63 Notes of State Council meeting from 18 October 1787, in Arkhiv Gosudarstvennago Soveta 12 vols. 
(St. Petersburg, 1869) 1: 485.  
64 For contracts and special privileges, see RGADA f. 21 (Naval Department) op. 1 d. 86 ll. 187-
187ob.; RGAVMF f. 150 (Commission for Archipelago Affairs) op. 1 d. 67, ll. 28-29; RGADA f. 10 op. 1 
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assumption that their goals were synonymous with its own. Introducing the marks of 
distinctions that it did with a different vocabulary, financial incentives, and contracts 
moved the government towards a conceptual distinction of privateers as financially 
motivated persons with no personal relationship to the Russian monarch. Instead of 
personal obligations of service, it was contracts that regulated the activities of these 
persons; bereft of a sovereign’s power to punish privateers for infractions, the 
Russian Empire turned to the normative force of law to regulate their behavior.  
 
Conclusion 
Although they were won on the ground, each of Russia’s three major wars under 
Empress Catherine II – two against the Ottoman Empire (1768-1774 and 1787-1791) 
and one against Sweden (1788-1790) – had a substantial naval component. In these 
wars Russia’s naval strategy evolved towards a more determined effort to attack 
enemy commerce to destabilize the seat of enemy power and to harm commercial 
interests, with the deliberate use of privateers to achieve these goals. Their 
deployment under the Russian flag reflected a shift in Russian political and strategic 
culture where the privateer became a new kind of Russian combatant, representing 
an entirely different relationship to the Russian state. As this chapter has shown, 
elements of the old Russian political order gave way for this historical process to 
transform auxiliary troops from the Eastern Mediterranean into “privateers.” 
Privateers were emblematic of changes that took place in Catherine II’s Russia as it 
turned to new strategies of imperial rule that included an emphasis on law and 
legality, new articulations of the relationship between the state and its subjects, and 
diverse mechanisms for exercising Russian sovereignty at sea and overseas. 
 For nearly three decades the Russian Empire tried to reconcile eager 
foreigners asking for commissions to plunder Russian enemies at sea with the 
Russian model of military service only to realize the privateers did not fit into the 
social structures of Russian society. For this reason it is particularly striking that 
Russia’s Rules for Privateers were addressed to Russian subjects, as there were few 
Russian subjects qualified to sail their own vessels who were not already enlisted in 
the imperial Russian navy. The genesis of this document is not clear, but it was likely 
intended to guide the several merchant ships fitted out in the Black Sea and the 
notorious Lambros Katsonis who headed the Mediterranean where by the middle of 
1788 his privateer flotilla was in full operation. Most of the cases that were ultimately 
adjudicated according to this legislation by the Commission for Archipelago Affairs 
were not concerned with the affairs of Russian subjects. However, they stood in 
sharp relief with foreigners as well. Foreign subjects in Russian service were 
governed by the laws of the soslovie to which they belonged. As Eric Lohr has noted, 
soslovie membership was more important than Russian subjecthood to determining 
one’s belonging in early-modern Russia.66 And until the late eighteenth century, 
foreigners in Russia’s armed forces were subject to the disciplinary power of the 
Military and Naval Statutes. 
Instead, privateers came to have a different arrangement with the government, 
one that rested not on a belonging to the society and obligations to the state but on 
the combatants’ specific services. The existence of privateers reflected many things 
about the Russian government: its belief in the normative power of law to regulate the 
privateers’ behavior; the gallicization of the Russian language in the vocabulary used 
to describe them; greater emphasis on commerce raiding in wartime. But by 
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emphasizing financial incentives and legal norms to regulate privateer activities, the 
Russian state signaled that privateers existed in a different conceptual space from its 
other troops. The ambiguity of their legal status in the Catherinian era ended with the 
case of Lambros Katsonis, in which the Commission for Archipelago Affairs 
determined that Katsonis’s actions in wartime ultimately did not support state 
interests.67 With this decision came moral clarity and privateers came to represent a 
social group with no allegiance to the Russian state, no longer confused for the 
Russian monarch’s “loyal subjects” imbued with “zeal and willingness to serve Her 
Imperial Majesty.” When the Russian Empire recruited privateers in the nineteenth 
century, it never again looked to its own subjects for the role. 
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